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Abst ract - -A  three-country, two-bloc trade model is used to determine the impact of a coalition 
within the blocs on the optimal pricing policies of the bloc. It is shown in a North-South world where 
the South has to cooperate for efficient pricing policy. In addition to the complexities of interactions 
between three countries, a dynamic game approach leads to the usage of numerical methods in this 
paper. We used a new algorithm based on adaptive search procedure called genetic algorithm to 
optimize strategies for three-person discrete dynamic games. Welfare implications are also addressed. 
Keywords--Genetic algorithm, Discrete dynamic games, Three-country ade, Coalition. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, countries have grouped for international economic ooperation with less than 
full success. Relapses into conflicting policies have been frequent. Progress appears to be better 
achieved in certain regions (the North) than in others uch as poor regions (the South). This may 
be due to closer and more frequent contacts that, at the international level, are institutionally 
possible among advanced nations. In the Southern countries, cooperation is limited by two 
factors--institutional deficiencies and trade barriers. As in the North, as well as a dismantling 
of trade barriers, the South needs institutions to facilitate cooperative trade. Specialization and 
trade within an industry across national frontiers is difficult o organize without institutions which 
operate asily across nations. A number of common markets and regional trading agreements 
have tried to provide the required trading infrastructure and reduce trade restriction within the 
South. 
In an interdependent world, rational policymakers in one country may be expected to condition 
their actions on policies pursued in other countries; policymaking has unavoidable game aspects. 
In the absence of direct cooperation, it is well known that the outcome of such games is socially 
inefficient. In this paper, we describe a game that is played by agents in three countries. The 
analysis has at least three objectives. The first is to investigate he nature of optimal noncoop- 
erative strategies played between more than two players. The second is to explore the impact of 
cooperative actions and outcomes between some of the players within the three-country world. 
The third is to introduce a new solution procedure for numerical optimization of the discrete 
dynamic games using Genetic Algorithm. 
The three-country, two-commodity model is developed to illustrate the dynamics between the 
North and the South. This study presents a simple model of international trade and growth 
between the industrial region and the nonindustrial primary exporting region. There are two 
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Southern economies that perceive themselves as being in competition with each other for prof- 
itable international trade. The model is described as a dynamic game between three countries in 
which the North determines the rate of investment each period, whereas countries in the South 
determine their terms of trade. The goal is to compare the noncooperative solution in which 
each country optimizes while taking as given the strategies abroad, with the cooperative (coali- 
tion) equilibria in the South in which binding commitments can be made between the Southern 
countries. 
In two-person games, players had to share the control of their own fate with a partner, but 
they had control over their partner's fate, which they could use as a threat. In n-person (three- 
person) games, even this threat is generally denied by the players. They must form coalitions 
with others and consider what inducements hey must offer and accept. Hence, we consider a 
world economy in which two resource producing nations (the South) and one resourceless nation 
(the North) are involved. For the economic situation containing only one country in the North, 
we regard the North as player 1 and resource xtracter countries as player 2 and player 3. Thus, 
the situation enables us to model both a noncooperative and a cooperative three-person game 
where two players in the South make a coalition. 
Dynamic games based on dynamic models almost inevitably lead to solutions which are ana- 
lytically intractable [1]. It is true that with considerable ingenuity, simplifying assumptions can 
be made which enable tractable solutions to emerge. But solutions for the dynamic game equilib- 
ria concepts et out in this paper require numerical solutions given particular sets of parameter 
values. The optimal control problems are quite difficult to deal with numerically. The task of 
designing and implementing algorithms for the solution of optimal control problems is the diffi- 
cult part. However, genetic algorithms (GA) require little knowledge of the problem itself, and 
therefore, computations based on these algorithms are very attractive to dynamic optimization 
problems, particularly the discrete dynamic game used in this study. 
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out the two bloc, two good model. Section 3 
describes the solution procedure and methodology for numerical analysis in the three-person 
game framework. The optimum solutions for various cases in noncooperative and cooperative 
strategies are analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 provides conclusions and suggestions for future 
research. 
2. THE MODEL 
The three-country model to be discussed isas follows. The analysis i  conducted within a similar 
dynamic North-South model of Galor [2], where this time there are two Southern countries and 
the model is discrete. The Southern countries produce an essential raw material using a single 
factor (labor) and sell the raw material to the North. The production functions for raw material R
in the two countries are 
Rlt = blLlt and R2t = b2L2t, 
where L~t is the amount of labor used in the production of raw material R~t in the country i of 
the South. We adapt he assumption that small countries, like the Southern countries, with small 
markets would specialize in constant returns products [3]. On the other hand, the North produces 
a single composite commodity which can be used either for consumption or for investment. The 
production function for good Yt is governed by fixed proportions production function 
Yt = min[aKt, nNt, rRt], 
where Kt, Nt, and Rt are the amount of capital, labor, and raw material used, respectively, 
in the output production at time t. This production function is used merely for simplicity of 
exposition in the three-country world. There is nothing intrinsic about it. One could utilize 
Cobb-Douglas or CES production functions equally well and obtain similar esults, though at the 
cost of considerably more time and algebra. 
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The North's labor force is fixed over time at given level N; however, unlimited guest workers 
are available in the three-country world at a given real wage ~, causing the supply of labor faced 
by the North to be perfectly elastic at this wage [4]. The raw material cannot be produced in the 
North, but bought from any of the countries in the South that offers the minimum fixed price 
per unit, P~e in terms of consumption good (i -- 1, 2). Assuming no foreign investment in the 
North, the production function depends on the proportion of capital available 
Yt = age, 
where K, is determined by the given initial capital stock of the North, K0. 
By the specification of the production function in the North, we dan derive the labor and raw 
material requirements of the North as follows: 
aKt  aKe 
Ne = and Re-  
n r 
Full employment of the North's labor force is assumed at the initial time, i.e., K0 > nN/a .  
The North invests a proportion st of the return to its capital at time t while the rest is devoted 
to consumption. Its entire wage income is consumed, assuming ~ is the subsistence l vel in the 
North. Hence, the problem faced by the North is to choose a rate of investment s to maximize 







Kt+l  = [Yt - w (Nt  - IV) - min(p l t ,p2, )Rt ]  st + (1 - a)Kt ,  
O N = [Yt - ff~ (Nt  - IV) - min(pmp2, )Rt ]  (1 - st), 
K0 given, 
0<st<l ,  
(1) 
where 0 < p < is a subjective time discount factor. The capital stock evolves according to 
Kt+l  = [Yt - ffJ (Nt  - N)  - min(pl t ,P2t)Rt]  st + (1 - 5)Kt, 
where 0 < ~ < 1 is the depreciation rate and the portion st of Northern income thus earned will 
be saved and invested. Also, the selection criterion for the price of raw material Pit offered by 
the country i in the South, being minimum, is added in both of the consumption and investment 
equations of the North. 
Finally, in order to derive the optimal rate of investment s ream and estimate the model, the 
constant risk aversion (CARA) utility function is adapted: 
where the degree of risk aversion a > 0 and a ¢ 1. 2 
1The terminal condition in this study is rather arbitrary. The game is played for certain periods chosen initially. 
We assume that there will be no game after T periods; however, in general terminal conditions are chosen where 
the stable equilibria of the economy are satisfied. Since the terminal conditions are not an important part of the 
aim of this study, we disregard the analysis of the terminal conditions. 
2The constant elasticity of substitution utility has the economic property that elasticity of substitution between 
consumptions in any two points in time is constant and equals to 1/a. This instantaneous tility function is 
frequently used in intertemporal optimizing model and has no relevant effect on the conclusion of the study. 
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On the other hand, the problem of the country i (i = 1, 2) in the South is to choose the terms 
of trade Pit that maximizes the discounted value of its consumption stream. 
Southern consumption is used for consumption only 
Ct s~ = p~tRit, i = 1, 2. 
From the production function of the North, the price of raw material has no direct effect on the 
output produced in the North, but through the accumulation of capital, the price affects the 
current investment and consumption i the North. 
The South is characterized by the existence of surplus labor. The supply of labor is perfectly 
elastic at a fixed real wage @ in terms of the consumption good. The South trades the raw 
material for the consumption good produced in the North. The terms of trade determined by 
the South at any point in time are assumed to be greater than the price which enables the South 
to consume at least the subsistence l vel and smaller than the price which enables the North to 
consume strictly more than its subsistence l vel. 
In this world economy, the demand for the raw material by the North is determined according 
to the production technology in the North. The primary product is demanded for investment 
and consumption purposes in the North and the division of any amount demanded from each of 
the i th country in the South depends on the price offered by the South (i = 1, 2). 
It is assumed that in addition to the production cost in the South, there is also the cost of 
carrying, holding, or destroying for the amount unsold (cost of overage). Thus, in the three- 
country world where Southern countries are the same type, the amount of primary product 
demand from the ith country in the South is randomly determined by the North when both of 
the countries offer the same minimum price (Pit = P2t). Hence, under risk, the terms of trade 
decisions of the South will cover the cost of overage denoted by d. 






Kt+l = [Yt - ffl (Nt - N)  - min(Plt,P2)Rt] st + (1 - ~)Kt, 
Ct sl = P l tR l t  - J lt ,  
Rt, if Pit = min(plt,P2t), Pit # P~t, 
Rl t  = atRt ,  if Pit = min(Plt,P2t), Pit = P~t, 
O, if Pit # min(Plt,P~t), 
0, if Rlt  = Rt, 








Kt+l  = [Yt - @ (Nt - N)  - min(Plt,P2)Rt] st + (1 - 6)Kt,  
Ct s~ = p~t R2t - J2t, 
Rt, ifp2t = min(Plt,P2t), Pit # P2t, 
R~t = (1 - ctt)Rt, if P2t = min(Plt,P2t), Pit = P~t, 
0, if P2t # min(plt,P2t), 
(3) 
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0, if R2t = Pit, 
J2t / d(Rt  - R2t), if R2t ~ Rt, 
Ko given, 
where at is a random variable which determines the raw material bought by the North from 
the country i of the South. We can consider at as demand shock. It is assumed that there is 
no transaction cost in the world, so the North is indifferent to buying raw material from any of 
the Southern countries if both offer the same minimum price; hence, according to the number 
generated between and including zero and one, the amount sold by each Southern country will 
be determined. Even when any one of the Southern countries offers the minimum price, there 
is always the possibility of selling no raw material to the North. The world is uncertain for the 
South. 
Since it is assumed that the consumption goods and the raw material are not storable goods, 
in the cases of similar price offers, each Southern country will suffer a positive amount of cost of 
getting rid of the excess production if at < 1. Then the South trades the raw material for the 
consumption goods produced in the North accordingly 
-dRt, 
t i t  = (p l ta t  - d(1 - 
Plt Rt , 
p2tRt ,  
= - a t )  - 
Plt Rt , 
if at = 0, 
if 0 < at < 1, 
if at = 1, 
if at : 0, 
if 0 < at < 1, 
if at = 1. 
Under certainty, the terms of trade determined by the South, Pit at any point in time, would 
be greater than the subsistence l vel ~/bi (i = 1, 2); however, in the three-country world with 
constant demand of raw material by the North, the South should consider the cost of unsold units 
of their production. Because of the existence of the risk of not selling all of the raw material 
produced in the country i, each Southern country takes destroying cost (cost of overage) of excess 
production into the derivation of its minimum price offer. 
Since the amount of raw material demanded from the i th country is determined randomly 
(0 _< at <_ 1) by the North, Southern countries will calculate xpected value of this random 
variable and determine their minimum offers 
d(l - a e) 
Plt ~ ae -b bla-----~, 
da e 
p2t > (1 + 
where a e is the expected value of the random variable a. The expected value of the random 
variable at with uniform distribution over [0, 1] is 0.5, and thus, the minimum price offered by 
the country i in the South is 
2~ 
Pit >- -~i + d, i = 1, 2. 
In order to obtain concrete results, we adapt the assumption that Southern countries also have 
identical and homothetic tastes as in the North: 
- -  T: ; ,  i = I, 2, 
where a > 0 and a ~ 1. 
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3. DYNAMIC  EQUIL IBR IA  
The equilibria will be determined by the simultaneous solution of the three countries' problem. 
The solution of the North's maximization problem determines the optimal time path of st given 
the South's prices Pit and P2t, whereas the solution of the country i of the South's maximization 
problem determines the optimal path of Pit given the paths of st and Pjtj#~. The dynamic 
equilibria re given by the triplet solution [s~, P~t, Pit]. 
3.1. Solution Procedure  
In this three-country game, players move or act simultaneously within each stage or period of 
the game and know the actions that were chosen in all past strategies. This three-country game is 
a dynamic game that concerns itself with determining how policymakers, or agents, within each 
economy, acting over time, choose optimally among some given set of actions. A crucial point 
is that even within a deterministic context, the choice of plan and the nature of the underlying 
information pattern is critical to the equilibrium outcome of the game. This is in contrast to a 
single-country d namic optimization context where, under the assumptions of uncertainty, such 
a choice is unimportant. 
In a dynamic game, a precise delineation ofthe information pattern, such as which agent knows 
what, how the information pattern available to each agent evolves over time, how much of this 
is common information shared by all players, and what part of it constitutes private information 
for each player, is of paramount importance. An information set is open loop if only the priori 
raw data set is available at all points in time, and in this case the policy variables that depend 
only upon time are called open loop policies. 
The players are assumed to never observe any history other than their moves and time. At 
the beginning of the game, they must choose time paths of actions that depend only on calendar 
time; hence, the dynamic equilibrium in open loop strategies found in this experiment is an open 
loop equilibrium. 
If the players can condition their strategies on other variables in addition to calendar time, they 
may prefer not to use open loop strategies in order to react to mixed strategies and the possible 
deviations by their rivals from the equilibrium strategies. Such strategies are called closed loop 
strategies which is valid when the players can observe and respond to their opponent's action at 
the end of each period. However, in this study, open loop strategies are preferred. First, they 
are analytically tractable in the three-country game because the closed loop strategy space is 
so much larger. Second, it is assumed that the players in the South are small in the sense that 
unexpected deviations by the opponent would have little influence on the player's optimal play. 
The solutions of dynamic games with multiperiod even for two-player games are hard to handle 
analytically; a three-player game would immediately increase the strategy space to search. We 
have to first set the rule of the game and adapt the shared memory algorithm developed by 
C)zyddmm [5] for the numerical solution of the dynamic game (see the Appendix). 3 
Finally, in this three-country world, there are two countries which are allowed to be identical 
or different in production technology which enables us to analyze various experiments over the 
dynamic North-South game. 
3.2. Shared Memory Algorithm for Three  Players 
Many techniques are used today for optimizing control systems. Most of these techniques can 
be broadly classified under two main classes: calculus-based techniques and enumerative schemes. 
The calculus-based techniques, although extensively used, have the following drawbacks: they are 
local in slope, i.e., the extrema they seek are the ones closer to the current point, and they depend 
3The flowchart given in the Appendix summarizes the logic of the algorithm to solve the discrete dynamic game 
between two players during a fixed duration. 
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on the existence of either derivatives or some function evaluation scheme. Thus, calculus-based 
methods lack robustness over the broad spectrum of optimization functions. Many enumerative 
schemes have been proposed to overcome the shortcomings of calculus-based methods. These 
schemes lack efficiency because many practical search spaces are too large to search. Another 
type of algorithm that has gained popularity is the random search technique. This algorithm 
lacks efficiency, and in the long run can be expected to do no better than enumerative schemes. 
One technique that is global and robust over a broad spectrum of problems is the genetic 
algorithm (GA). Genetic algorithms are search procedures based on the mechanics of natural 
genetics. Genetic algorithms were originally developed by Holland [6]. The approach is very 
different from classical search methods, where movement is from one point in the search space to 
another point based on some transition rule. Another important difference between GAs and the 
classical approaches is in the selection of the transition rule. In classical methods of optimization, 
the transition rule is deterministic. In contrast, GAs use probabilistic operators to guide their 
search [7]. 




Reproduction is a process where old strings are carried through into a new population depending 
on the performance index (i.e., fitness or utility) values. Due to this move, strings with better 
fitness values get large numbers of copies in the next generation. Selecting ood strings for 
the reproduction operation can be implemented in many different ways. A simple crossover 
follows reproduction i three steps. First, the newly reproduced strings are paired together at 
random. Second, an integer position along every pair of strings is selected uniformly at random. 
Finally, based on a probability of crossover, the paired strings undergo crossing over at the integer 
position n along the strings. This results in new pairs of strings that are created by swapping all 
of the characters between 1 and n inclusively. Although the crossover operator is a randomized 
event, when combined with reproduction it becomes an effective means of exchanging information 
and combining portions of good quality solutions. Reproduction and crossover give GAs most of 
their search power. The third operator, mutation, is simply an occasional random alteration of a 
string position (based on the probability of mutation). In a binary code, this involves changing 
a 1 to a 0 and vice versa. The mutation operator helps in avoiding the possibility of mistaking a
local minimum for a global minimum. When mutation is used sparingly with reproduction and 
crossover, it improves the global nature of the genetic algorithm search. 
At first glance, it seems trange, or at least interesting, that such a simple mechanism should 
motivate anything useful; however, genetic algorithm is strictly inductive when compared with 
other search methods, which are ploddingly deductive. However, induction for its own sake is 
not a compelling argument to use for any method, unless it can be shown how and when the 
method is likely to converge. Holland's chema theorem places the theory of genetic algorithms 
on rigorous footing by calculating a bound on the growth of useful similarities or building blocks. 
The fundamental principle of GAs is to make good use of these similarity templates [8]. 
The genetic algorithm we described is mostly applied to optimal control theory which involves 
the calculation of time paths for one or more variables in order to minimize or maximize some 
functional. However, for the problems where there are more than one player or controller, dif- 
ferent algorithms need to be developed and/or used that consider the dynamics arising from the 
interactions among different decision makers. Since the interests do not coincide, game-theoretic 
considerations become important. A solution concept from game theory which has been used a 
lot in economic applications i the noncooperative solution, or Nash equilibrium [9]. The open- 
loop noncooperative solution is a sequence of decisions for each time period, and these decisions 
all depend on the initial state and in the presence of uncertainty on observed isturbances. 
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To solve n-persons (three-persons) optimization problem in dynamic games, a Nash equilibrium 
is solved jointly for {st,plt,P2t}, t = 0, 1,... ,T [10]. Thus, we developed an algorithm in which 
GA is used to solve dynamic games for n-players. 
Briefly, we have parallelly implemented n-separate genetic algorithms where each GA is used to 
solve the discrete optimal problem of the player in the game. Each player has its own evaluation 
function derived by substituting the constraints of that player to its own objective function. 
Naturally, in each evaluation function, the choice variables (strategies) ofthe other players causing 
conflicts are also included. In the open-loop Nash equilibria, each player takes the entire future 
path of the others' (n - 1 players) controls as given and chooses its vector of optimal strategies 
over time. The North, in choosing {st}t=o to maximize u(C N) subject o the dynamics of the 
system described in the model, takes K0 and Pit, i = 1,2 for t _> 0 as given, while player i in the 
South in choosing {Pit}t=o to maximize u(CtS'), takes the whole time paths of st and Pjt,j#i as 
given. So, we used the solution procedure of both open-loop solutions and genetic algorithm and 
developed the algorithm described below. 4
A genetic algorithm to solve a problem must have five components: 
1. Bit string (O's and l's) representation f solutions of the problem. 
2. A way to create an initial population of solutions. 
3. An evaluation function that rates the solutions in terms of fitness. 
4. Genetic operators that generate new solutions. 
5. Values of the parameters that the genetic algorithm uses (population size, probabilities of 
applying genetic operators, etc.). 
Initialization routines vary. For research purposes, a good deal can be learned by initializing a 
population randomly. Moving from a randomly created population to a well-adapted population is 
a good test of the algorithm, since the critical features of the final solution will have been produced 
by the search and recombination mechanisms of the algorithm, rather than the initialization 
procedures. Hence, each player's GA begins with the randomly generated policies of all parties. 
In our experiment, the North calculates its initial evaluation function using randomly generated 
sequence of {Pit, P2t } T=o 
T 
t=O 
where U 1 is the North's evaluation function at the first iteration which contains the entire pricing 
policies of the Southern countries. The same initial procedure is applied to the Southern coun- 
{st,plt}t=o, tries, where U~, and U~2 are calculated using randomly generated {st,pzt }To and T 
respectively. Thus, in our three-country world, the initial best (b) results {st,plt,p2t}t= o b  b b T are 
obtained from randomly generated policies. The information about the best strategies of the 
other players at each iteration is kept in the shared memory 5 where each player sends its best 
results and in exchange learns the best results of the other players. Hence, each player uses the 
best strategies of the other players (n - 1) in each generation (or iteration) while solving its own 
problem. Here, still, the best does not mean the optimum for a particular functional. Thus, each 
side solves its problem and writes the best solutions to the shared memory and waits for the 
other sides to do the same thing. The waiting procedure is very important since each iteration or 
generation has to be evaluated synchronically. After copying the results of the other players, the 
problem of each player is to find the optimum time path of the variable(s) under investigation. 
Using the close relation between the derivation of open-loop Nash equilibria and the problem 
of solving (jointly) n optimal control problems Ill], we used GA to optimize the control system 
of each player. GA is a probabilistic algorithm which maintains a population of individuals, 
4For details, see the Appendix and/or [5]. 
5All the programs in this study are worked in the UNIX operating system and written in the C programming 
language. So, we adapted the term shared memory from the UNIX environment and used it to provide three 
processes haring a memory segment. 
Dynamic Game Approach 51 
P(t) = {Xl,..., xn} where xi = {X~l,..., XiT}. Each individual x~ represents a potential solution 
vector to the problem at hand. Each solution vector is evaluated to give some measure of 
its fitness (utility value). Then, a new population is formed by selecting the more fit solutions 
(individuals). Some members of the new population undergo transformations by means of genetic 
operators (crossover, mutation) to form the new solution set. This procedure is repeated until 
the global optimum is converged for the problem under investigation. 
It is crucial to understand that the evaluation functions are derived by substituting constraints 
into the objective functions of the particular problem; hence GA does not use first-order conditions 
to derive the optimal strategies for each player. 
Even if the whole solution algorithm seems trange, since GA is a highly parallel mathematical 
algorithm, it is very successful in solving n-person discrete dynamic games. Most computer 
programs consist of a control sequence (the instructions) and a collection of data elements. Large 
programs have tens of thousands or even millions of data elements. There are opportunities 
for parallelism in both the control sequence and the collection of data elements. In the control 
sequence, it is possible to identify threads of control that could operate independently, and thus, 
on different processors. This is the method used for programming most multiprocessor computers. 
The primary problems with this approach are the difficulties of identifying and synchronizing 
these independent threads of control [12]. 
We used a similar idea for this particular Nash equilibria, where we have to solve the problem 
jointly as systems of equations. Hence, the whole system is divided into n (three in this study) 
parallel systems and solved using the proved schema theory behind CA. Since both the theory 
and the findings atisfy the optimality conditions such as first-order and second-order conditions, 
we can immediately say GA works in the open-loop equilibria of the discrete dynamic games. 
4. OPT IMAL STRATEGIES AND 
EQUIL IBRIUM TIME PATHS 
The North's maximization problem (1) will be solved for the rate of investment, and the 
country i's problem (i = 1, 2), (2) and (3), respectively, in the South are solved for the term 
of trade using numerical analysis. For the numerical results, we have to specify some of the 
benchmark parameter values used: 
a=5 n=4 r=4 p=0.95 N=20 
=1 d=0 a=0.5  6=0.05 K0=100. 
In the benchmark parameter, unit cost of destroying excess production (cost of overage) in the 
Southern economies i  set to d = 0 for simplicity. Thus, the subsistence l vel, or minimum level of 
price, will be P~t _> 2/b~, and according to the value of productivity parameter in the ith country 
of the South, the minimum offers will be determined. 
The parameters necessary for the genetic algorithm, the crossover, and the mutation rates are 
0.60 and 0.03, respectively. 8 These rates are default rates in most of the genetic algorithms. All 
of the experiments are done for 500,000 trials and for T = 12. 7 Even the choice of planning 
horizon is arbitrary; the trade relations and commitments between three countries would be less 
informative for longer periods. 
In our analysis, we consider three representative cases. 
CASE 1. IDENTICAL TECHNOLOGIES IN THE SOUTH (bl = b2). Certain features of Southern 
economies are of particular elevance to the applicability and implications of the various the- 
ories [13]. These features all stem from lower levels of development. One of these features is 
8We used the publicly documented Genetic Search Implementation System, GENESIS developed by Grefenetette 
for the optimiT.ation of the genetic operators. 
7The period can be taken as months or years. 
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that Southern economies are characterized by very substantial e ements of inefficiency in terms 
of underemployment of some resources and poor productivity of resources in use. As far as the 
South is concerned, the criteria for assessing international trade are generally broader than in 
much gains from trade literature, but the employment of resources i one obvious gain in any 
case .  
We start our analysis assuming that two of the Southern economies are characterized with the 
same production technology and productivity for producing raw material: 
bl : b2 : I .  
Thus, the minimum price for any of the Southern countries will be p~ > 2, i = 1,2. With the 
benchmark parameters and the productivity parameter of the Southern technology, the optimal 
strategies for a noncooperative three-country game are summarized in Table 1. Both of the 
Southern economies offer minimum price according to the expected selection criterion for the 
North. Within symmetric technology in the South, no transaction and no transportation world, 
the optimal strategies of the noncooperatively acting Southern economies will offer minimum 
price even at the end of the world. Since the amount sold will be determined exogenously and 
randomly, the welfare u* of each Southern country would be different even though both offered 
the same price. Thus, in this experiment, the second Southern country trades and gains more, 
compared to the first country. However, if this experiment is repeated again, in these symmetric 
countries in the South, none of the Southern ations has a guarantee of gaining trade with the 
North over the other Southern ation. 
Table 1. Opt imal  strategies. 
t st Pit P2~ 
0 1.000 2.816 2.000 
1 1.000 2.000 2.247 
2 1.000 2.000 2.345 
3 1.000 2.000 2.000 
4 1.000 2.000 2.000 
5 1.000 2.651 2.000 
6 0.990 2.000 2.000 
7 0.996 2.000 2.000 
8 0.988 2.000 2.000 
9 0.961 2.000 2.000 
10 0.874 2.000 2.000 
11 0.576 2.000 2.000 
12 0.000 2.000 2.000 
u* 25868 25481 49325 
Table 2. Opt imal  strategies. 
t st  Pit  P2t 
0 1.000 1.016 
1 1.000 1.008 
2 1.000 1.055 
3 1.000 1.008 
4 1.000 1.061 
5 1.000 1.047 
6 0.996 1.016 
7 0.988 1.016 
8 0.949 1.016 
9 0.937 1.008 
10 0.874 1.031 
11 0.498 1.596 
12 0.000 1.988 
u* 140910 231290 0 
Over the 12 periods, the North saves all in the early periods and grows and then consumes 
fifteen percent of their output after ten periods and consumes all at the end of the planning 
horizon. In this numeric study, we did not specify any end value for the state variables, but 
specified only the end of period, and the optimal strategy at the end of the period is determined 
within the model. 
The stationary values for this game are reached within less than ten periods: 
* 1 .  P~t=P~t=2,  s t = 
CASE 2. DIFFERENT TECHNOLOGIES IN THE SOUTH (bl ~ b2). As producers become increas- 
ingly dependent on the Southern markets, developments in the South will have a commensurately 
bigger effect on output in rich countries. Thus, improved terms of trade or rising productivity in
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the South will reduce the cost of the North's imports, giving consumers a boost in real income. 
In this section, we allow one of the Southern economies to be more productive: 
b1= 2 > b2 = l .  
Thus, the minimum prices will be Pit _> 1 and P2t >_ 2 for all t. Then, the optimal strategies for 
the asymmetric Southern case are summarized inTable 2. The impact of improved terms of trade 
in one of the Southern economies boosts the annual income of the trading countries. Hence, even 
though the saving behavior of the North is similar to the previous case, in terms of aggregate 
income, the trade is strongly beneficial for the North and the productive South. The welfare of 
both nations is increased, while the less productive Southern country is not able to sell and earns 
zero utility. So, the best policy for that country will be either to increase its productivity or to 
specialize in the production of another competitive good. 
The pricing of extractive resources has traditionally been the source of North-South conflict, 
with the exporting South trying for better prices and the North resisting the South. Changes in 
the price of some resources such as oil, however, have forged a strong interdependence between 
the North and the South, both in real and in financial markets. There is now common interest 
between exporters and importers in keeping prices within a reasonable range neither too high nor 
too low [14]. In this experiment, we observed that the pricing policy of the productive Southern 
country is to offer low price for the periods when the North saves and grows rapidly and then to 
increase the price slightly less than the minimum price that can be offered by the other Southern 
country. The result can be taken as supportive to the neoclassical view since we clearly observed 
welfare gain from the trade of the two nations in the three-country world. 
CASE 3. COOPERATION IN THE SOUTH. Suppose now that two players in the South agree to 
cooperate for minimizing the risk and maximizing their intertemporal utility. In a three-players 
game, a subset of the player set (2 C 3) is called a coalition. In the world described in this study, 
the same type Southern countries under risk act cooperatively before determining their pricing 
policies. By coalition, they will get rid of excess usage of their resources in the production of one 
good. Also, by the elimination of possible cost of overage, it becomes 








Kt+l = [Yt - ~ (Nt  - -N) - p tn t ]  st + (1 - $)Kt ,  
- -  - e (g ,  - - p tRt l (1  - s,), 
Ko given, 
O_<st_<l. 







Kt+l  - -  -  (Nt - - p tRt l s t  + (1 - e )Kt ,  
Ct s= PtRt, 
Ko given. 
( s )  
54 S. ()ZYILDIPAM 
Table 3. Optimal strategies. 
t st pe 
0 1.000 1.023 
1 1.000 1.047 
2 1.000 1.016 
3 1.000 1.031 
4 1.000 1.008 
5 1.000 1.016 
6 1.000 1.008 
7 1.000 1.000 
8 0.918 1.031 
9 0.839 1.016 
10 0.435 1.196 
11 0.071 2.451 
12 0.000 2.976 
u* 70628 183400 
In our experiment, using the technology where b = 1, the minimum prices are Pt ~ 1 for all t. 
Hence, with the reduction in the resource prices the trade between North and South becomes 
beneficial for all parties (Table 3). 
Assuming that both of the Southern countries share equally the welfare gain from the trade, it 
is found that the welfare of each country is u* = 91700, i = 1,2, which is higher than the one in 
noncooperative symmetric case. Hence, all of the three players gain from cooperative strategies. 
Thus, the elimination of random shock in demand lowered the prices, but increased the trade 
and welfare of the parties in the game. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The sharp pricing shocks of the 1970s raised the attention to the possible conflicts of interests 
between resource xporters and importers. As well as having common interests in certain types 
of price movements, exporters and importers hared influence over the price movements. They 
should design their economic policies so as to use their joint influences to pursue common interest. 
The dynamic aspects of economic interdependence have invited the application of dynamic 
game theory. To characterize the relations between the players in the North-South interactions, 
we examined the symmetric equilibria of Nash differential games, open-loop, using GA. The non- 
cooperative equilibria have been compared with the cooperative equilibrium in noncoordinated 
resource pricing and investment s rategies. 
In the model presented here, international coalition leads to dynamically efficient rade relations 
within the three-country world. The welfare impacts of the cooperation are obvious. 
Although the solution algorithm studied in this paper is designed for nonconvex dynamic games, 
the model itself is simple; extensions in the direction of generating a rich model structure will be 
desirable. Finally, future research might profitably examine the terminal condition where the all 
economies reach the stability. Instead of solving the game where the world will end at the end of 
T periods, we have to solve the game that the terminal periods for each country are chosen where 
the economies reach their stable equilibria. However, since the aim of this study is to introduce 
a new technique for solving dynamic games where the terminal conditions are rather certain by 
either targets of decision variables or periods, we disregard the choice of terminal conditions in 
this study. Nevertheless if the equilibrium states are known, and when the economies' reach to 
these states is known, the adjustment is straightforward. 
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Figure 1. Shared memory algorithm for two players. 
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